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This paper studies the eect of strategic complementarity among rms' lumpy investments on
the 
uctuations of aggregate investments. We investigate an extensive panel data set on Italian
manufacturing rms. We rst show that the 
uctuations of fraction of rms that experience large
investment rates in a region-year follow a double-exponential distribution. We then estimate
the degree of the strategic complementarity within a region directly by estimating the rm's
decision on lumpy investments. We propose a simple sectoral model which is capable of generating
the double-exponential distribution for the aggregate 
uctuations that arise from the strategic
complementarity among rms' lumpy investments. We argue that the shape and magnitude
of the aggregate 
uctuations observed in the data are consistent with the degree of strategic
complementarity estimated at the micro-level in the same data.
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11 Introduction
This paper empirically studies the aggregate 
uctuations that arise from the complementarity of rms'
decisions. Our strategy is to focus on the distribution shape of the 
uctuations in order to dierentiate
the aggregate consequence of the endogenous or exogenous mechanism of the 
uctuations.
Models of interacting individuals have studied the possibility that the interaction gives rise to
aggregate shifts endogenously (Brock and Durlauf [4], Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [15]). It
has been recognized that the models of endogenous eects are often unidentied econometrically, as
Manski [21] formulated as a re
ection problem. In the context of sectoral comovements, it has been
proposed to utilize the heterogeneous input-output relations to instrument the endogeneity by Shea
[23, 24] and Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons [2]. In the context of information spillovers, Guiso
and Schivardi [16] recently tackles the problem by utilizing additional information on the reference
network of rms.
In this paper, we analyze the same data on Italian rms as Guiso and Schivardi, with a new
concentration on large investment episodes. First, we establish that the aggregate 
uctuation of the
lumpy investments follows a non-normal, exponential distribution empirically. We show that the
normality hypothesis is rejected statistically, and is also dominated statistically by an alternative
double-exponential hypothesis. Secondly, we present a simple sectoral model with lumpy investments
that generates the exponential distribution, while the model generates a normal distribution if it lacks
the lumpy behaviors. The model predicts that the parameter of the distribution of the aggregate

uctuations is determined by the degree of strategic complementarity among rms' lumpy investments.
Thirdly, we estimate the strategic complementarity from the rm-level data. We use the input-
output matrix to identify the endogenous eects for the rm's decision on lumpy investments. In
accordance with Bartelsman et al., we observe the externality eect through the output-weighted
sectoral activities in the short run. Finally, we show that the complementarity estimated at the micro
level is consistent with the 
uctuation distribution estimated at the aggregate level. While Guiso and
Schivardi investigate information spillovers of continuous investment decisions within an industry, we
focus on interactions of lumpy investments within a region. By nding the exponential distribution,
we argue that the lumpiness of the investment decision has an important consequence on aggregate

uctuations. Also, we use the input-output relations to identify the endogenous eects, while Guiso
and Schivardi utilize the interview data that describe which rms observe which upon their investment
2decisions.
Aggregate consequences of micro-level lumpy investments have been a topic of extensive discussion.
On the one hand, researchers traditionally emphasize the \law of large numbers" eect by which
individual lumpy investments cancel out with each other in aggregation. For example, Long and
Plosser's [19] sectoral business cycles model has met such arguments by Lucas [20] and Dupor [13]. On
the other hand, researchers have investigated the eects of the density of rms around the threshold for
lumpy adjustments on aggregate investments. If the capital level of many rms are positioned near to
the threshold level for adjustments and far from the desired level of capital, then aggregate investment
is likely to increase in near future. This mechanism has been studied empirically by Caballero and
Engel [6] and Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power [10]. However, theoretical investigations have shown
that the distribution of rms' gaps between desired and actual capital has an invariant distribution
and its convergence is fast (Caplin and Spulber [8] and Caballero and Engel [5]), implying that some
aggregate shocks need to be present in order for the extensive margin to 
uctuate, such as in the
model of Caplin and Leahy [7]. In this line of research, the lumpy investments provide a mechanism
of amplifying the exogenous aggregate shocks and of deferring the timing of the impacts.
There is a possibility that the interaction of rms' lumpy investments causes the aggregate 
uc-
tuations without aggregate shocks (Nirei [22]). Consider a one-sided (S,s) policy in which rms tend
to be distributed uniformly over an inaction band. If there are a continuum of rms, we obtain the
\neutrality" result in which lumpy investments do not cause aggregate 
uctuations (Caplin and Spul-
ber [8], Caballero and Engel [5]). Now, suppose that there are a large, nite number of rms which
are distributed evenly in the inaction band with slight disturbances. Also suppose that the lumpy
investments are strategic complements. Then, when a rm that is the closest to the threshold decides
to invest, it can cause another lumpy investment of the rm that is positioned at the second closest
to the threshold. The investment of the second closest can further cause an investment of the third
closest, and so on. This chain reaction stops at the point where there is no rm that is positioned
close enough to the threshold. The mechanism is similar to the domino game: the line of falling tiles
stops at where two adjacent tiles are standing apart too far. Since the stopping point is altered greatly
by a slight change in standing points, the domino eect generates a varying degree of amplication of
individual shocks.
We investigate such domino eects in the interaction of lumpy investments in the Long-Plosser
type model. The Long-Plosser model exhibits a multiplier eect of idiosyncratic shocks. If the
3individual behavior is lumpy, then the multiplier itself behaves stochastically, because the it depends
on the initial random state just like the standing points of domino tiles. In the model, we show
that the aggregate 
uctuations generated by the domino eect follow an exponential tail, whereas the
standard Long-Plosser model generates a normal distribution. We argue that the particular shape of
the distribution of aggregate 
uctuations may serve as a symptom that dierentiates the endogenous
shock model from the exogenous shock model. Often the sources of the exogenous common shock are
driven by many factors. In those cases, the central limit theorem predicts that the common shock
should follow a normal distribution even when the factors that comprise the common shock follow
non-normal distributions. Conversely, when we nd a normal distribution in the aggregate variable,
it is reasonable to include an unspecied set of exogenous shocks in the model.
The central limit theorem does not characterize the aggregate distribution if there are endogenous
eects, since the rms' actions are correlated in that case. Let us consider the simplest case of
endogenous eects where the probability for agent i to act (ai;r = 1) depends on the realized action of
its neighbor i   1. Suppose that Pr(ai;r = 1) = ai 1;r. In this case, an action by i = 1 may cause a
domino eect on the successive agents. The distribution of the number of agents who act,
PN
i=1 ai;r,
follows an exponential distribution. The distribution shape depends on the precise structure of the
interactions. In the case of the herd behavior model (Banerjee [1]), for example, the agent i's action
is aected by the actions taken by any agent j who acted before i, i.e., j = 1;2;:::;i 1. In this case,
there is a probability mass on the event that all agents act. The exponential distribution generated
by domino eects appears to be robust as long as the domino eect does not degenerate to such a
deterministic cascade. We will show that this is in fact the case in our sectoral model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents an evi-
dence that the fraction of rms that engage in large investments follows the exponential distribution
rather than the normal distribution. Section 3 presents a model of lumpy investment that generates
the exponential distribution. The model provides a testable prediction that relates the macro-level
property, namely the distribution parameter of aggregate 
uctuations, to the micro-level property,
namely the degree of strategic complementarity. In Section 4, we numerically simulate the calibrated
model, and show that the empirical distribution is tted well by the simulated distribution. In Section
5, we estimate the rm's decision on lumpy investment directly, and match the estimated strategic



















Figure 1: Histogram of rms' investment rates IPK(i;t)
2 Fluctuations of aggregate lumpy investments
2.1 Data and variables
We use longitudinal data of Italian rms drawn from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS).
The data set we use was compiled by Guiso and Schivardi [16]. The annual data set covers over 30,000
rms from 20 regions, 25 industries, and 15 years from 1982 to 1996.
We focus on the number of rms that experience large investment episodes in a given reference
group in each year. First, we dene an investment-capital ratio, IPK(i;t), for each rm i and year t.
Figure 1 depicts a histogram of IPK(i;t). We can see that the distribution is highly skewed to the
right. 24% of the samples have investment rates less than 2%. The tail is long, and it implies that a
relatively small fraction of rms has large impacts on aggregate investments.
Such a long tail in investment rates is observed commonly as in Doms and Dunne [12] and Cooper
et al. [10]. Doms and Dunne also found the salient spiking of investment behaviors, in which rms
adjust capital actively in a short period and show little adjustments in other periods. Along with
the literature following their ndings, we are most concerned with the aggregate consequence of such
spiking investments. Thus, we divide the heterogeneous behaviors of IPK into two polar groups,
5lumpy investments and inactions. That is, we convert the investment-capital ratio into a binary
variable, d(i;t), which takes 1 if IPK(i;t) >  d and zero otherwise. We take the threshold  d at
20% for our estimation, in order to be comparable with the literature on lumpy investments ([10] for
example). The sum of the lumpy investments dened as such accounts for about 20% of the aggregate
investments in our data. The results obtained in this paper are not aected very much when we
change the threshold to 10% or 30%.
This paper is concerned with the fraction of investing rms, X(G;t) =
P
i2G d(i;t)=#G, where
G is a reference group and #G is the number of rms in G.1 We drop the groups that have rms
less than 10, because the behavior of the fraction X can be overly volatile for the groups that have a
small number of rms.2 We then dene a centered fraction variable ~ X(G;t)  X(G;t) hX(G;t)iG.
Namely, yearly common eects across reference groups is subtracted from X(G;t). We work with
the region reference group Gr which is a set of rms that operate in the same region r, as well as the
industry-region reference group Gl;r where l is an industry. The variables of interest are summarized
in Table 1.
Figure 2 plots the histogram of X(Gl;r;t) for each year. We observe a general pattern of the
distributions: they are fairly centered and their center location 
uctuates over years. In this paper,
we regard the annual common shock as exogenous, and concentrate on the remaining 
uctuations
observed across reference groups. The left panel of Figure 3 shows the histogram of ~ X(Gl;r) in which
the yearly eect on X is subtracted. The histogram of ~ X(Gl;r) is fairly symmetric. In the right panel
is the centered histogram for region reference groups ~ X(Gr), which shows the similar pattern to the
industry-region histogram.
Our goal is to characterize and explain the distribution of the fraction of investing rms ~ X. Figure
4 shows semi-log plots of the cumulative distributions of ~ X(Gl;r;t) and ~ X(Gr;t) for positive and
negative sides. To produce the plot, we rst divide ~ X into two groups depending on the sign of ~ X,
and for each positive or negative group we rank j ~ Xj in a descending order. Then, the log of the rank
divided by the total number of observations is plotted against j ~ Xj for positive and negative groups.
1The number of observations in the reference G may change over time. The time subscript t is suppressed here only
for simplicity.
2Original data le contains 306363 observations. We drop observations with missing industry or region codes, and
one outlier of the variable \ioverk". Then we are left with 283210 observations. When we work with the fraction
variables X, we also exclude small reference groups that contain less than 10 rms. In the regression analysis that
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Figure 2: Histograms of X(Gl;r;t) for each year











































Figure 3: Histograms of ~ X(Gl;r) (left) and ~ X(Gr) (right)
7Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
d(i;t) 283210 0.224 0.417 0 1 0
X(Gl;r;t) 3234 0.213 0.141 0 0.830 0.185
#Gl;r 3234 84 154 10 1465 33
X(Gr;t) 298 0.208 0.119 0 0.538 0.179
#Gr 298 950 1396 10 7919 381
X(Gl;t) 362 0.210 0.116 0 0.571 0.183
#Gl 362 782 936 10 4825 392
Table 1: Description of variables. X is the number of rms that engage in lumpy investments divided
by the total number of rms in a reference group. Reference groups with less than 10 rms are dropped
from the observation.
Thus, the vertical line shows the percentile in the descending order. We observe a steeper slope for
the regional distribution compared to the industry-regional distribution.
We now t parametric distributions to the empirical distribution. Our null hypothesis is the normal
distribution. An alternative hypothesis is the double-exponential distribution, in which the distribu-
tion of ~ X(Gl;r;t) follows exponential distributions for the positive and negative sides with possibly
dierent means + and  . Namely, the likelihood function is Pr( ~ X = ~ xj~ x > 0) = (1=+)e (1=+)~ x
and Pr( ~ X = ~ xj~ x < 0) = (1= )e (1= )( ~ x). The other alternative hypothesis is the Laplace distribu-
tion in which both positive and negative sides of ~ X follow an exponential distribution with the same
mean : Pr( ~ X = ~ x) = (1=(2))e (1=)j~ xj.
Table 2 shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation for each parametrization and for
each reference group. We start from the industry-region reference group ~ X(Gl;r;t). The estimated
mean of the exponential distribution is 0:071 (standard error 0:002) for the positive side and 0:062
(standard error 0:002) for the negative side of ~ X. The estimated  for the Laplacian is 0:066, which
is the middle value for the exponential slopes for the positive and negative sides. The exponential
hypothesis has a larger log likelihood value than the Laplacian hypothesis, because the Laplacian
distribution is equivalent to the double-exponential distribution with restriction + =  .
We test the normality hypothesis by a likelihood-based test. Let L(i;H) denote the likelihood of






















Figure 4: Semi-log plots of cumulative distributions of j ~ X(Gl;r;t)j and j ~ X(Gr;t)j for positive and
negative values. The distributions are cumulated from above.
9Industry-region ~ X(Gl;r;t) Region ~ X(Gr;t)
Exponential Laplace Normal Exponential Laplace Normal
ML estimates + 0.071  0.066  0.000 + 0.031  0.031  0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
  0.062  0.090   0.031  0.042
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Log Likelihood 3337 3185 3200 531.9 518.4 519.7
Vuong's statistic 4.98 Null 1.30 Null
-0.50 Null -0.12 Null
10.70 Null 3.06 Null
Table 2: Parameter estimates for various distributions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
sample point i under the hypothesis H. Dene the log likelihood ratio for each i as li = logL(i;H1) 
logL(i;H0). We use Vuong's statistic V 
p
N li=Std(li) which follows a standard normal distribution
if the hypotheses H0 and H1 are \equivalent" in the sense of Kullback-Leibler information. Thus, if
V computed for H1 against the null H0 is greater than 1.96, then the null is rejected in favor of the
alternative at the 5% signicance level. Vuong's statistics are reported in Table 2 for the exponential
and the Laplacian hypotheses against the Gaussian null hypothesis and for the exponential against the
Laplacian. The exponential is favored against the Gaussian and the Laplacian at the 1% signicance,
while the Laplacian is not signicantly dierent from the Gaussian. We repeat the same test for
~ X(Gr;t) on the right side of Table 2. Vuong's statistics suggest that the exponential hypothesis is
favored against the Laplacian hypothesis at 1% signicance level, but it is not signicantly dierent
from the Gaussian. Note that we have fewer observations for the region group compared to the
industry-region group. Thus, we lose the testing power somewhat due to the limited number of
observations for the case of regional distribution.
We now turn to another normality test which is based on higher moments. Table 3 shows the higher
moments of ~ X. The large kurtosis indicates that ~ X is leptokurtic. Standard normality tests such as
skewness-kurtosis test, Shapiro-Wilk test, and Shapiro-Francia test reject the normality hypothesis
overwhelmingly for both ~ X(Gl;r;t) and ~ X(Gr;t).
10Variable Observations Mean Std Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
~ X(Gl;r;t) 3234 0 0.090 0.537 5.274
~ X(Gr;t) 298 0 0.042 0.692 6.703
Table 3: Moments of ~ X
We also conduct a test that is only based on kurtosis but not on skewness. The concentration of the
4th moment is useful in order to test among a class of symmetric distributions, in our case the Laplacian
and the Gaussian. The true kurtosis is equal to 3 under the Gaussian hypothesis and 6 under the






its asymptotic variance is V (x4
i)=2N. Under the Gaussian hypothesis, the variance is equal to
96=N. Thus, the sample kurtosis in Table 3 rejects the Gaussian hypothesis at 1% signicance, even
though the estimator is not ecient. In contrast, the asymptotic variance of the MOM estimator
is (8!   4!2)=28N = 155:25=N under the Laplacian hypothesis. Thus, the MOM test permits the
Laplacian hypothesis at 5% signicance for ~ X(Gr;t).
The good t of the exponential parametrization can be seen in Figure 4. In the semi-log scale,
an exponential distribution function would show as a linear line. Our plot demonstrates that the
positive side of the distribution of ~ X(Gl;r;t) is well tted by a linear line. The negative side has a
kink beyond which the distribution shows a faster decline than the positive side. The faster decline
in the negative side can be caused by the boundary eect of X(Gl;r;t) which takes only non-negative
values. Since X(Gl;r;t) has mean 0:21 and standard deviation 0:14 as in Table 1, it is natural that
the distribution of ~ X shows a boundary eect that is seen in the empirical distribution at around
 0:17. This explanation is also consistent with the patterns of yearly distributions shown in Figure
2. The distribution is skewed in the years when the distributions are close to zero, such as in 1984
and 1992, whereas the distribution is not skewed in the boom years when the distributions are far
from zero, such as in 1994, 1995, and 1996. The downward kink may be the reason why Vuong's test
cannot reject the Gaussian hypothesis for ~ X(Gl;r;t). The right panel of Figure 4 shows a distribution
of ~ X(Gr;t). The distribution does not exhibit the kink for the negative side, since the zero-bound is
not binding for ~ X(Gr;t) due to its small standard deviation.
In sum, we show that the distribution of the fraction of rms that engage in lumpy investments
11exhibits an exponential decay rather than a Gaussian decay at the industry-region level or the region
level. Thus, the empirical distribution favors the model that generates an exponential pattern than
the models that generate normal distributions for the aggregate 
uctuation of investments. The

uctuation we investigated captures the extent of aggregate 
uctuations that are not explained by
the common annual shocks. For the case of the regional level, the variation of ~ X(Gr;t) accounts for a
third of the total variation in X(Gr;t). In the following sections, we try to understand the mechanism
that generates the exponential pattern of the aggregate 
uctuation.
3 A model of endogenous investment 
uctuations
This section presents a simple model of endogenous investment 
uctuations that generates an expo-
nential tail for the distribution of X as we observed previously. Consider that there are N rms that
produce dierentiated goods with a production function:
yi = Ain
i : (1)
Ai is an exogenous productivity, and ni is input goods. The returns-to-scale of production is  < 1.






where i > 1 is the exogenous parameter for lumpiness. The constraint represents the situation where
rms must choose an integer for the number of plants, although we restrict growth rates rather than
levels for the sake of tractability.















where  > 1. Note that the input weight i;j is dierent across i. By i;j we incorporate the
heterogeneous inter-industrial eects in the input-output relations. Dene the aggregate index of













12Then, the derived demand for good j is given in an isoelastic form as: z
i;j = (pj=Pi) i;jni. Thus,
the derived demand z





We assume that each rm i is owned by household i as in a backyard production economy. House-
hold i's income is the prot i from producing good i. Households have a common utility function













i Ci, and  =
P
i i. Also dene the























C;j = PCCi = i.
The equilibrium condition for good i is yi =
P










j njj;i + CC;i: (7)







Each rm is a monopolistic supplier of a dierentiated good. Its prot is dened as i = piyi  
P
j pjzi;j. The second term, the cost of inputs, is equal to Pini at optimum by the result of cost
minimization. The monopolist's problem is thus maxni piyi   Pini subject to (1), (2), and (6). We
dene an \inaction band" of ni by the lower and upper thresholds [n
i;in
i). We can nd such
thresholds by noting that the prots must be equalized at the two boundaries of the inaction band


















Consider the situation where the productivity Ai is a random variable independent across i. For
each realization of the productivity prole, an equilibrium prole of ni is determined by the threshold
13rule n
i  ni < in
i and the discreteness constraint (2). We are interested in the probability distribu-
tion of the fraction of investing rms (the fraction takes a negative value if rms adjust downward),
when the exogenous productivities Ai's are slightly perturbed.
Suppose that we are at an equilibrium, and now a small perturbation on Ai aects the equilibrium.
An increase in Ai raises n
i, and then induces i to increase ni to ini if i was near the lower threshold
n
i. The increase in ni raises the demand for other goods Yj's. The shift in demand increases n
j's,
and thus the rms near the lower threshold n
j may then choose to increase nj by a factor of j. This
propagation process continues until the economy reaches a new equilibrium. We regard this process
as a ctitious tatonnement, and an equilibrium selection algorithm as in Vives [25] and Cooper [9].
The ctitious tatonnement is dened in Appendix A.1 precisely. The selected equilibrium has the
property that the equilibrium is the closest to the initial equilibrium in the direction of the search
(namely, the direction of the initial adjustment).
In what follows we analytically show that the model generates the exponential distribution for
the 
uctuations of the fraction of investing rms. The analytical characterization is carried out by
embedding the ctitious tatonnement in a stochastic process ex ante the random variables realize,
following the method presented in a separate paper [22]. Here we consider the case when the input
weight i;j is the same across i: j = i;j for all i. The numerical simulations of the heterogeneous
case under calibrated parameters are presented in the next section. The aggregate output is simplied






























































































Here ni is the initial level of input that is determined by the productivity and the aggregate de-
mand before the perturbation. Thus si is the state associated to the initial equilibrium before the



















for large N. From (16), we see that the investment decision depends on the exogenous shock on Ai
and the endogenous shock on Y . An investment by rm j increases Y , which reduces the gap and
increases the likelihood of rm i to invest. The magnitude of this impact of logj on the gap of i







Note that for an upward lumpy adjustment, dlognj=logj = 1. Also, the rst fraction in (14) is 1=N
if rms are homogeneous, and the second fraction is approximately log j when the lumpiness is small
(j is close to 1). Thus, the impact on the gap variable is roughly equal to =N in the homogeneous
case. Consider a random variable of si unconditional on i and Ai that is distributed on the unit
circumference of a circle. We suppose, as a rst-order approximation of the distribution, that the
density around si = 0 is constant q. Then the probability that j's adjustment induces i to adjust
is equal to qbj=logi. The probability is reduced to q=N for the homogeneous case with small
lumpiness.
Consider the ctitious tatonnement process that starts from the initial state (si). Suppose that
there is one rm j that adjusts capital at the rst round of the tatonnement upon the perturbation.
Then, the number of rms that are induced to adjust in the second step of the tatonnement conditional
on the adjustment of rm j follows a convolution of a Bernoulli trial with probability qbi=logj across
i. Thus the number of rms that are induced to adjust in the second step unconditionally follows
a mixture across j of the convolution above, which is an integer random variable with mean  
15qE(
PN
i=1 bi)E(1=logj). Then, the number of rms mu that adjust in each step u of the tatonnement
conditional to mu 1 follows a distribution that is represented as a mu 1-times convolution of a certain
integer random variable with mean . The integer random variable is identically distributed across
u as long as N is so large that
Pu
v=1 mv=N is small and thus the density of si of the aected rms
is constant at q (see [22] for further details and generalizations). Then we can utilize the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Otter) Consider a branching process mu, u = 1;2;:::; that starts from m1 = 1. Let




Pr(jMj = mjm1 = 1) = C0(e 1=) mm 1:5 (18)
for a large integer m, where C0 is a constant.
When N tends to innity, mu approximately follows a Poisson distribution with mean mu 1. By
using this, the analytical result can be sharpened when the lumpiness i, the productivity Ai, and
the input weight i;j are homogeneous across i;j.
Proposition 1 When i, Ai and i;j are common across i;j, M follows a symmetric probability
distribution function:
Pr(jMj = m j m1) = m1e (m+m1)m(m + m1)m 1=m!: (19)
The tail of the distribution function is approximated as:
Pr(jMj = w j m1)  (m1e(1 )m1=
p
2)(e 1=) mm 1:5: (20)
Proof: This result draws on Nirei [22]. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 shows that M follows a distribution that is a mixture of power and exponential
functions as seen in (20). Since the exponential function declines faster than the power function, the
tail of the distribution is dominated by the exponential part. We will argue that this corresponds to
our empirical ndings that X follows an exponential distribution. Proposition 1 further shows that
the slope of the exponential distribution is determined by . By Equation (18), the exponential slope
is    1   log, and the mean and standard deviation of the exponential part is determined by the
16inverse of the slope. Since the slope is decreasing in  in the region  < 1, a large  implies a large

uctuation of M. This is intuitive, because  is the mean number of rms that are induced to invest
by a rm's lumpy investment in the ctitious tatonnement.
In the model,  is directly aected by , which summarizes the impact of a lumpy investment
on the gap variable si of other rms in the micro-level investment decision (16). In this sense, 
is the parameter of strategic complementarity among rms' lumpy investments. From (13), a small
returns-to-scale (small ) or a low mark-up (large ) implies a small  and , and thus a steep slope.
This prediction will be conrmed in a calibrated simulation in the next section.
Since  appears in the single rm's decision rule (16), we can estimate it from the panel data
independently from the estimation of the distribution of the aggregate 
uctuations. Thus, Proposition
1 provides a testable implication that connects the two estimates at the micro level and the macro
level. In Section 5, we estimate the rm's decision at the micro level, and use this connection to test
the validity of the model.
4 Numerical simulations
In this section, we simulate the model under calibrated parameters. We calibrate the distribution of
i to an exponential distribution with lower bound 1:1 and mean 1:2, which mimics the histogram of
investment rate in our data (shown in Figure 1). We set i;j as a transpose of the Italian input-output
matrix normalized to 1 column-wise.3 We also set Ai to mimic the distribution of total input demand
across industry in the input-output matrix. The returns to scale is set at  = 0:8 and 0:9. The  is
set at 6 and 11, which corresponds to the mark-up rate  at 20% and 10%, respectively (the mark-up
rate satises  = 1=(   1)).
We compute the distribution of the number of investing rms numerically under the calibration.
We rst draw the proles of i and Ai, and compute the initial equilibrium for the realization. Then
we add a small shock to Ai (the variance of the shock is set so that the mean number of rms that
adjust to the shock initially is 1), and compute a new equilibrium. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the
histogram of the fraction of rms that adjust their capital upward in the transition from the old to the
3We use the 1985 version of the Italian transaction table to identify the industrial relation. We convert the original
4-digit industry code of the Italian rms in our data set to 2-digit industry code that is consistent with the OECD
classication. With the data available we end up with 25 industries.

















































Figure 5: Left: simulated histogram of the fraction of investing rms when the sizes of lumpiness,
industry, and input weights are heterogeneous. Right: the cumulative distribution of j ~ X(Gr;t)j and
the simulated distribution.
new equilibrium (a negative number means that those rms adjust capital downward). The vertical
axis is log-scaled, and thus a linear line implies an exponential decay. The simulated histogram clearly
conforms to the exponential pattern.
Next, we try to match with the empirical exponential distribution of ~ X(Gr;t) shown in Figure 4.
The variance of ~ X(Gr;t) is much larger than the variances of the simulated distributions shown in
the cases  = 0:8;0:9. Thus, we repeat the simulation with a higher returns to scale at  = 0:95, and
also computed the sum of the fraction of rms across 60 periods. We compare the resulting simulated
distribution with the distribution of ~ X(Gr;t) in the right panel of Figure 5. We observe a good
tting. The summation across periods has a similar eect to increasing the perturbation size. The
time-accumulation does round the shape of exponential distribution toward the normal distribution
near the mean 0, as predicted by the central limit theorem, but it still preserves the exponential tail far
from the mean. Moreover, it improves the tting around 0, because the empirical distribution shows
a slight deviation from the exponential distribution that is well captured by the rounding eect.
The left panel of Figure 6 shows the distribution of the log-deviation in aggregate output
P
i piyi.
The plots show that the aggregate output largely inherits the exponential pattern in the distribution
































































Figure 6: Simulated histograms of the log-deviations of aggregate output when adjustments are lumpy
(left) and when adjustments are smooth (right)
of the fraction of investing rms, although we observe a fatter tail than the exponential for the case
 = 0:9 and  = 0:2. We can analytically show that the inheritance of the exponential decay from
the fraction of investing rms to the aggregate output is exact if the input weights and the lumpiness
are homogeneous.
In contrast to the exponential pattern we observe so far, the aggregate 
uctuation follows a normal
distribution if there is no discreteness constraint (2). The right panel of Figure 6 shows that the log
deviation of aggregate output Y when the same realizations of the random variables occur as in
the lumpy economy we have observed so far. In the semi-log plot, a normal distribution looks as a
parabola. The plot clearly shows the parabola for the case of continuous adjustments.
We can derive the normal distribution in the smooth economy analytically when i and i;j are
common across i. By taking the rst order condition with respect to ni and combining with the


























As we can see above, the equilibrium output Y is a weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks Ai, and
follows a normal distribution as N tends to innity.
19Another salient dierence between the distributions in Figure 6 is the magnitude of 
uctuations.
The standard deviation in the smooth economy is one-digit smaller than that in the lumpy economy
even though they incur the same realization of random shocks. Thus, the micro-level lumpy adjust-
ments have a strong eect of magnifying exogenous independent shocks. It is not that the smooth
economy is completely lacking the magnifying mechanism. Consider a simple case where the micro
decision is positively dependent on the aggregate such as xi = 
PN
j=1 xj=N +. Then the exogenous
shock will be magnied by the multiplier 1=(1   ). In the case of lumpy adjustments, however, the
multiplier eect at the micro-level is non-linear because of the threshold rule. Thus, the aggregation
mechanism works as if the multiplier itself is stochastic, because the multiplier depends on the prole
of underlying heterogeneous productivity before the perturbation. This is just like the small devia-
tions in the standing points of domino tiles greatly aect the resulting number of falling tiles. The
exponential tail we have observed in the aggregates captures the nature of this stochastic multiplier
eect, and thus it is a symptom of the endogenous 
uctuation mechanism.
5 Consistency with micro-level estimate
In this section, we test the model in the previous section by examining whether the strategic com-
plementarity observed in the micro data is strong enough to generate the exponential distribution
observed in the aggregate data. In the model, the magnitude of 
uctuations is largely determined by
, the degree of strategic complementarity, which is determined by  and . The  was calibrated to
a reasonable markup rate 10%, but  was taken as a free parameter. In the simulations,  was set so
that  was at around 0.67. In this section, we provide an empirical estimate that justies this choice
of .
We start by directly estimating the individual rm's decision rule on lumpy investment. Each rm
faces a binary choice d(i;t) 2 f0;1g whether or not to engage in a lumpy investment. We would like
to estimate the binary decision rule in the model (16) by a probit model. According to the optimal
decision rule, the lumpy investment is more likely to occur when the perturbation in productivity
logAi and/or the perturbed derived demand Y is large. (Note that, in (16), ni is the equilibrium
input before the perturbation, and thus predetermined by the levels of Ai and Y .) By using (17),
Y is rewritten as 
P
l blXlNl where l is an industry, bl is bj for any rm j in industry l (by abuse
of notation), Xl is the fraction of rms in industry l that engage in lumpy investments after the
20perturbation, and Nl is the number of rms in industry l. As seen in the denition (14), bl is the
weight that is determined by the importance of industry l as an input good and the relative size of
the industry l.
Our goal is to estimate the strategic complementarity in lumpy investments within a region, namely,
the impact of a lumpy investment on the likelihood of lumpy investment of other rms within the same
region. Thus, we are most concerned with , the impact of the fraction of rms that engage in lumpy
investment in Gri on i's likelihood for investment spiking. A simple regression of di;t on Xri;t would
pick up a common shock eect that aects all the rms in a region-year. Thus, we include a region-year
dummy to control for the common shock. Because Xri;t is constructed by the left-hand-side variable
d(i;t) in the same region, however, a direct estimation would still cause an endogeneity bias in the
estimate of . We avoid this issue by the structure of the model in which the impact derived demand
is heterogeneous across industries. Namely, we will identify the endogenous eects within region by
using the industrial dimension as an instrument. This method follows Shea [23] and Bartelsman et al.
[2]. Our estimator satises the conditions in Brock and Durlauf [4] for the identication of this type
of estimator.
We follow a two-step procedure to construct a proxy variable that captures the portion of the
derived demand in a region-year that is aected by industrial exogenous shocks. First, we regress
Xli;ri;t on a constant and year-dummies, and construct ~ Xli;ri;t by subtracting the year eect (captured
by the year-dummy) from Xli;ri;t. Repeat the same procedure for the industry-year fraction Xli;t and
construct ~ Xli;t that is the industry-year fraction less common year eects. Thus, ~ Xli;t captures the
industry-wide common shock on lumpy investments, which we deem exogenous to the rm in industries
other than li. We regress ~ Xli;ri;t on ~ Xli;t and obtain linear predictors. The predictors ^ Xli;ri;t are then
used as proxies for the exogenous portion of the variation in ~ Xli;ri;t.
Next, we normalize the input-output matrix  so that the sum for each row is equal to 1. We call
it OW which stands for \output-weighted" following Bartelsman et al. [2]. OW(j;k) represents a
\demand-pull" or \customer" impact from k-th column to j-th row. This is seen as follows. Suppose
that there is one percent increase in the production in industry k. Now OW(j;k) represents the
fraction of industry j's output demanded by k. Thus the demand for j is increased by OW(j;k), other
things being equal. Then we dene XOW
i;t 
P
k6=li OW(li;k) ^ Xk;ri;t#Gk;ri=#Gri. XOW
i;t represents
the total exogenous demand shock coming from all the rms in the same region but in the dierent
industries. Likewise, we construct an input-weighted matrix IW, which represents a \supply-push"
21Output-weighted Input-weighted Hybrid
d=dx (s.e.) d=dx (s.e.) d=dx (s.e.)
TFP 0.0021*** (0.0006) 0.0021*** (0.0006) 0.0021*** (0.0006)
Lagged Cash Flow -3.3e-07 (2.1e-06) -3.3e-07 (2.1e-06) -3.3e-07 (2.1e-06)
Investment in (li;ri) 0.0023* (0.0012) 0.0020* (0.0012) 0.0022* (0.0012)
XOW 1.42*** (0.37) 1.38*** (0.38)
XIW 0.79 (0.63) 0.41 (0.64)
Loglikelihood -87376.19 -87382.72 -87375.99
Table 4: Probit estimation of rm's lumpy investment
or \supplier" impact from j-th row to k-th column, by normalizing  column-wise. Using IW as a
weight, we obtain XIW
i;t .
Then, we obtain a probit estimation equation as follows:





D's are dummy variables for industry, region, year, and region-year pair. Zi;t includes the measure
of productivity growth for rm i, the cash 
ow (normalized by capital) in the previous period, and
the aggregate investment in the industry-region which rm i belongs to, Ili;ri;t. The construction of
these variables in Zi;t is explained in Appendix B. The region-year dummy is included to address
the region-year common shocks. XOW
i;t and/or XIW
i;t are output- or input- weighted averages of the
exogenous industrial shocks. XOW
i;t and XIW
i;t are the exogenous portion of the impact of the derived
demand that arises from lumpy investment of other rms in the same region.
The estimation result is summarized in Table 4. The eect of total factor productivity is signi-
cantly positive, which is consistent with the decision rule (16). We observe a positive and signicant
estimate of OW, whereas the estimate of IW is nonsignicant. This result is consistent with the
\within" estimate of Bartelsman et al. [2]. In the short-run, the inter-industrial eect seems to 
ow
from the downstream to upstream. The aggregate investment in the industry-region has a weakly sig-
nicant mild eect. The lagged cash 
ow does not show a signicant eect on the lumpy investments.
Now we examine if the strategic complementarity estimated above can explain the exponential
distribution estimated in Section 2. The mean of the exponential distribution of j ~ Xj is estimated at
220:03 for the region-wide 
uctuations in Table 2. The median number of rms in Gr is 381 by Table
1. Hence, the median number of aected rms is about 12. By solving 1=12 =    1   log, we
indirectly obtain the estimate of  as ^  = 0:65. This number, estimated from aggregated data, falls
within the 90% condence interval of , (0:64;2:12), which is directly estimated from the micro-level
investment decisions in Table 4. Thus, our model of endogenous 
uctuations have passed a test of
internal consistency with the data we investigated.
This is not to say that our estimation of the strategic complementarity has explained all of the
exponential 
uctuation we observed. First, the connection between the complementarity and the
exponential slope was analytically established only for the case when the input weight i;j are common
across i. The actual input-output matrix shows a great deal of heterogeneity across rows, and hence it
may alter the relationship between  and the slope in the model. The importance of the heterogeneity
of the input weights in propagation mechanism has been emphasized by Horvath [17]. Secondly,
the condence interval of  is rather wide, and it will pass any exponential distribution that has a
suciently 
at slope. The meaningful content of the internal test we passed lies on the lower bound
of the estimated : the observed exponential distribution has a standard deviation that is larger than
what the minimum estimate of the strategic complementarity at the micro-level implies.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that the distribution of the fraction of rms that engage in large investments
provides a useful test for the existence of endogenous eects among the rms' investment decisions.
Testing of the endogenous eects is often a challenge because it is observationally equivalent to the
model with exogenous common shocks. We argue that, in a binary choice model, the common shock
model results in the normal distribution of the number of investing rms when the exogenous common
shock consists of many independent factors, whereas the endogenous eects leads to a non-normal
distribution that is better characterized by an exponential distribution.
We investigate the panel of investment data for Italian rms. We construct the fraction of rms that
engage in the investment with which the investment-capital ratio of the rm exceeds certain thresh-
old. The fraction samples are constructed for region-year groups and industry-region-year groups.
Those samples constitute a distribution of the fraction of investing rms for each denition of the
reference group. The results show that the normal distribution hypothesis is rejected by the empir-
23ical distributions, whereas the exponential distribution hypothesis is consistent with the empirical
distributions.
We present a simple model of lumpy investments when the rms' investment decisions are interre-
lated by strategic complementarity. The complementarity stems from the fact that rms are linked by
input-output relations. When a rm increases production, it generates an increased factor demand,
and thus provides an incentive for the rms in the upstream of the input-output relations to pro-
duce more. This model generates a non-normal distribution with exponential tail for the fraction of
investing rms, while it generates a normal distribution if there is no lumpy investments in the model.
Finally we estimate the degree of strategic complementarity by a micro-level estimation of the rm's
decision of the lumpy investment. We utilize the input-output relations to instrument the endogeneity
in estimation. Then, we compute the degree of strategic complementarity that is required by the model
so that the model explains the empirical magnitude of 
uctuations in the fractions of investing rms.




The tatonnement that converges to an equilibrium is a time series of the input prole nu = (n1;u;n2;u;:::;nN;u)
for u = 1;2;. It starts from the initial equilibrium that is dened for a realization of (Ai;0;i). The
initial point is denoted by n0. There is a corresponding threshold rule at the initial equilibrium. Its
lower bound prole is denoted by n
0. The gap variable is accordingly dened as (si;0).
Now a perturbation i is drawn independently across i. The productivity is perturbed such that
logAi;1 = logAi;0 + . Then the threshold is altered even if no rms change their input level at n0.
The new lower threshold under (A1;n0) is denoted by n
1. The gap variable changes to s1. We apply
the threshold rule, and some rms nd it optimal to adjust their input. The best reply is denoted by
n1.
Then the second round starts. Under (A1;n1), we compute a new prole of lower threshold n
2, a
gap variable s2, and a best reply n2. We iterate this process until nu converges. The stopping time is
24denoted by T. Thus, ni;T = ni;T 1 for all i.





















Suppose that rm i chooses to invest. Then logni;1   logni;0 = logi. We calculate the new
aggregate output by the Taylor series expansion around Y0 as follows:


















































Note that the rst term is of order N 1, and the higher order term results from the derivative of the
summation in the denominator of the rst term with respect to ni. From this we obtain the expression
(17) and (12).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
In the homogeneous set-up, the probability of the Bernoulli trial qbi=logj becomes q=N. Thus,
the number of rms mu that are induced to adjust upward in u by mu 1 rms who adjusted in the
previous step of the tatonnement u 1 follows a Poisson distribution with mean qmu 1 asymptotically
as N ! 1.
Since a Poisson distribution is innitely divisible, the Poisson variable with mean mu 1 is equiv-
alent to a mu 1-times convolution of a Poisson variable with mean . Thus the process mu for u  2
conditional to mu 1 is a branching process with a step random variable being a Poisson with mean 
for u  3, and m2 follows a Poisson with mean m1. Since   1, the process mu reaches 0 by a nite
stopping time with probability one (see [14]). Thus the best response dynamics is a valid algorithm
of equilibrium selection in a sense that the convergence is achieved by a nite stopping time T. By
using the property of the Poisson branching process [18], we obtain an innitely divisible distribution
called Borel-Tanner distribution for the accumulated sum M conditional to m2 as:
Pr(M = m j m2) = (m2=m)e m(m)m m2=(m   m2)! (26)
25for m = m2;m2 + 1;:::. Using that m2 follows the Poisson distribution with mean m1 (note that
m1 is not necessarily an integer), we obtain (19) in the Proposition as follows:







(m)m m2(m1)m2 1=((m   m2)!(m2   1)!)
= (m1e (m+m1)=m)(m + m1)m 1=(m   1)!
= m1e (m+m1)m(m + m1)m 1=m!: (27)













This completes the proof. 2
B Construction of the productivity measure and aggregate
investments
To estimate the total factor productivity Ai, we follow the procedure similar to Cooper and Halti-
wanger [11] and Bayer [3]. We start with the static optimization problem of a rm under a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
Y = ALLKK: (29)
















26where Y is the value added.
The expenditure shares for both labor and capital are heterogeneous across rms, and it is im-
possible to directly estimate L and K due to the dynamic structure of the panel data as Bayer [3]
pointed out. We instead calculate the average expenditure shares of rms for each industry and use
them for L and K above.
We also use an aggregate investment variable in order to capture its direct eect on d(i;t) in the









where Ii;t represents the real investment of rm i in year t and T is the total years in observation.
We take logarithm of I(Gli;ri;t) and then subtract its yearly trend. We use the residual, i.e. the
log-deviation of the aggregate investment in the industry-region, as a regressor in Zi;t.
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